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TRUST OVER TIME IN EXCHANGE RELATIONSHIPS:
META-ANALYSIS AND THEORY
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London, U.K.
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3 Department of Management, University of Munich, Munich, Germany
A common premise in prior research is that trust increases over time in relationships. Through a
meta-analysis of 39 studies, we find that the bivariate correlation between trust and relationship
duration (1) is on average positive and small, and (2) varies significantly across studies indicating
the presence of unobserved moderators. We therefore build a theoretical framework to specify
four different mechanisms—initial bias correction, change in relationship value, identification,
and trust-based selection—that may affect the development of trust. We then argue that the
relative strength of these mechanisms should influence whether trust increases, remains constant,
or decreases over time. © 2013 The Authors. Strategic Management Journal published by John
Wiley & Sons Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
Trust is a key factor in understanding perfor-
mance variation among relationships between
organizations (Granovetter, 1985; Lado, Dant, and
Tekleab, 2008; Li, Poppo, and Zhou, 2010; Luo,
2008; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Uzzi, 1997) as
well as within them (e.g., Davis et al., 2000; Fang
et al., 2008; Wang, He, and Mahoney, 2009).
Beyond its performance effects, trust (or the
lack thereof) is also used to explain the structure
of exchange relationships (Bradach and Eccles,
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1989; Granovetter, 1985; Gulati, 1995; Gulati
and Nickerson, 2008; Puranam and Vanneste,
2009; Reuer and Arin˜o, 2007; Ring and Van
de Ven, 1992; Shah and Swaminathan, 2008;
Uzzi, 1997; Williamson, 1975).
Scholars have often assumed that interactions
over time affect trust in a relationship (Ring and
Van de Ven, 1994). Many empirical studies mea-
suring trust predict it to increase with the dura-
tion of a relationship (e.g., Anderson and Weitz,
1989; Chua, Ingram, and Morris, 2008; Doney and
Cannon, 1997; Ganesan, 1994; Gulati and Sytch,
2008; Wang, Tomlinson, and Noe, 2010). Others
not measuring trust may use relationship length as
a proxy (or assume that trust increases over time)
when examining the effects of relationship dura-
tion (e.g., Corts and Singh, 2004; Greve et al.,
2010; Gulati, 1995; Parkhe, 1993; Vanneste and
Puranam, 2010). Yet, different studies report a
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positive regression coefficient between trust and
duration (e.g., Anderson and Weitz, 1989), a neg-
ative one (e.g., Poppo, Zhou, and Ryu, 2008), or
no relation (e.g., Doney and Cannon, 1997).
We study the evidence on trust and relationship
duration through a meta-analysis of 39 studies.
We extend prior meta-analyses in several ways.
Colquitt, Scott, and LePine (2007), Geyskens,
Steenkamp, and Kumar (1998), and Swan,
Bowers, and Richardson (1999) do not explore
relationship duration as an antecedent of trust.
Dirks and Ferrin (2002) meta-analyze the link
between trust and duration in the context of
leadership using five studies. Our more com-
prehensive aggregation of results shows that the
correlation between trust and relationship duration
is positive but small (Cohen, 1992), and we find
that the correlation varies more across studies than
expected by sampling error alone—suggesting
that unobserved moderators matter.
We also build a set of theoretical arguments
on why and how the relation between trust and
relationship duration may vary. Using Cole-
man’s (1990) formal description of trust, which
captures both rational and heuristic-based trust
(McEvily, 2011), we show that common trust
conceptualizations imply at least four mechanisms
influencing the development of trust over time:
initial bias correction, change in relationship
value, identification, and trust-based selection.
Our framework links trust and relationship dura-
tion via the relative strength of these potentially
countervailing mechanisms.
META-ANALYSIS
Identification of studies
To identify studies for our meta-analysis, we
first searched the Business Source Complete and
PsycINFO databases for the period 1887–2010.
We used the keywords trust* (to capture studies on
trust or trustworthiness) together with at least one
of history, duration, length, time, and frequency as
well as at least one of data, empirical, test, statis-
tical, finding*, result*, and evidence. This filtering
resulted in 1,435 and 2,351 articles (respectively)
culled from the two databases. Second, we
considered all articles published since 1980 that
mentioned “trust” (or a variant thereof) in the fol-
lowing journals (based on Geyskens, Steenkamp,
and Kumar, 2006): Academy of Management
Journal , Administrative Science Quarterly ,
International Journal of Research in Marketing ,
Journal of Applied Psychology , Journal of Busi-
ness Research , Journal of International Business
Studies , Journal of Management , Journal of Mar-
keting , Journal of Marketing Research , Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology , Management
Science, Marketing Science, Organizational
Behavior and Human Decision Processes , Orga-
nization Science, Personality & Social Psychology
Bulletin , Psychological Science, and Strategic
Management Journal . Third, we examined the
references listed in review articles on trust
(Colquitt et al., 2007; Dirks and Ferrin, 2002;
Ebert, 2007; Geyskens et al., 1998; Swan et al.,
1999). Fourth, we sent a request for unpublished
studies to approximately 350 trust researchers.
Finally, we went through the reference section of
each relevant paper identified previously.
We included a study if it met three conditions.
First, it had to employ a construct of trust or
trustworthiness broadly consistent with the defini-
tions of Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995) and
Rousseau et al. (1998), see the Theory section.
Second, it had to report the sample size and
pairwise correlation between trust and relationship
duration; these values are required for conducting
a meta-analysis. Third, the study had to be at the
interpersonal or interorganizational level (we shall
report any differences in findings for these two
levels).
Data set
We used three procedures to achieve indepen-
dence among the correlation coefficients in our
meta-analysis. First, for studies with multiple
independent samples, we separately included the
correlation from each sample. Second, for samples
with more than one correlation per unit of analysis
(i.e., interpersonal or interorganizational) due to
multiple operationalizations of a trust construct,
we calculated a single composite correlation (for
the formulas used to make this calculation, see
Hunter and Schmidt, 2004). Third, for studies
based on the same or overlapping data sets, we
included only one correlation in our meta-analysis.
We chose the correlation from the study with the
largest sample or, if the sample sizes were equal,
from the oldest article.
We used standard meta-analytical procedures to
establish that the most influential studies did not
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Table 1. Meta-analytic results for correlation between relationship duration and trust
k N r ρ̂
95% confidence
interval (ρ̂)
95% credibility
interval (ρ)
% variance
accounted for Q
47 9,632 0.11 0.12 0.09–0.16 -0.08–0.32 22.5 209.2***
k = number of effect sizes; N = total number of observations; r = sample size–weighted average observed correlation; ρ̂ = estimate
of corrected average population correlation; % variance accounted for = percentage of observed variance accounted for by statistical
artifacts; Q = chi-square test for homogeneity.
***p < 0.001.
clearly increase or decrease the sample weighted
average correlation (Huffcutt and Arthur, 1995).
These procedures—along with those already dis-
cussed under “Identification of studies”—yielded
a final set of 39 studies reporting k = 47 effect
sizes with a total of N = 9,632 observations.
Studies included in the meta-analysis are preceded
by a * in the References.
Meta-analytic calculations
We follow the Hunter and Schmidt (2004)
approach, which allows for the correction of
statistical artifacts in an attempt to estimate the
population correlation. We correct the observed
correlation coefficients (r) for biases arising from
three statistical artifacts: (1) dichotomization of the
relationship duration variable, (2) measurement
error in the trust variable, and (3) sampling error.
For each relationship duration variable, we
know whether it is dichotomized and, if so, at
what percentage the cutoff occurs (artifact 1). We
have information on the reliability of nearly all
trust variables (artifact 2). We lack information on
four effect sizes; for these, we take the average
reliability for the trust variable. For artifacts 1
and 2, we correct each correlation coefficient
following Hunter and Schmidt (2004). We then
meta-analyze the resulting corrected correlations
to obtain a sample-weighted average correlation
and variance. The variance is also corrected for
sampling error (artifact 3).
Finally, we investigate publication bias, which
exists if published studies systematically report
effect sizes that differ from those reported in
unpublished studies. Because the number of
unpublished studies in our data set is small
(with k = 2), we instead compare studies that
use trust and relationship duration as independent
variables with studies with one construct (i.e.,
trust) as the dependent variable. It is unlikely
that a single correlation between two independent
variables systematically affects the probability of
publication. If this is true, then comparing the
two sets of studies gives an indication whether
publication bias is present. The 29 effect sizes
reported when trust is the dependent variable are,
on average, 0.02 higher than the 18 effect sizes
reported when both trust and relationship duration
are independent variables. A t-test reveals that
this difference is not significant (p = 0.53), so we
find no evidence of publication bias.
RESULTS
Table 1 presents the meta-analytic findings. The
sample size–weighted average observed correla-
tion between trust and relationship duration is 0.11.
The estimate of the average corrected population
correlation is 0.12 (the 95% confidence interval
ranges from 0.09 to 0.16). The correlation between
trust and relationship duration can therefore be
classified as small (Cohen, 1992). Furthermore,
statistical artifacts (sampling and measurement
error) explain only 22.5 percent of the variance
in observed correlations. The chi-square test for
homogeneity is significantly different from 0
(p < 0.001), which indicates that the observed
variation is greater than what would be expected
to arise from chance alone. Taken together, these
findings suggest the presence of unobserved mod-
erator variables—as does the so-called 95 percent
credibility interval (within which 95% of the
population correlations lie (Hunter and Schmidt,
2004). It ranges from -0.08 to 0.32, which implies
significant variation in population correlations (and
not merely variation in estimates of the mean).
Because this credibility interval is large and (unlike
the confidence interval) includes 0, it suggests
that the calculated average correlation is more
likely to be the average of subpopulations (some
of which exhibit a negative correlation) than the
average of a single population (Whitener, 1990).
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In short, our meta-analysis reveals that (1) the
bivariate correlation between trust and relationship
duration is, on average, positive but small; and (2)
there are indications that unobserved factors mod-
erate this relationship. In two robustness tests, our
results are unaffected by the unit of analysis (inter-
personal versus interorganizational) or the mea-
surement of “trust” (trust versus trustworthiness).
THEORY
Prior literature suggests that trust and relation-
ship duration are positively correlated; our meta-
analysis shows that the correlation is positive but
weak. Moreover, this correlation is likely moder-
ated by unobserved factors, so that it could be 0 or
even negative under some conditions. We theorize
about these conditions by focusing on the mecha-
nisms affecting the association between trust and
relationship duration.
What is trust?
Scholars working within different literatures have
converged on a common meaning of trust.
Rousseau et al. (1998: 395) capture this consen-
sus in their definition of trust as “a psychological
state comprising the intention to accept vulnerabil-
ity based upon positive expectations of the inten-
tions or behavior of another.” Similar definitions
appear in Mayer et al. (1995: 712), Bhattacharya
et al. (1998: 462), and Coleman (1990: 99).
To systematically analyze how trust changes
over time, we use Coleman’s (1990) formal
description of trust that captures these key features
(see also Nooteboom, 2002, who uses the same
description). Consider a trustor who must decide
whether or not to establish a relation with a trustee
of unknown trustworthiness. To begin with, we
assume that trustworthiness does not change dur-
ing such a relation (we relax this restriction later).
Because trustworthiness is not directly observable,
the trustor can at best assign some subjective
probability that the trustee will act in a trustworthy
manner. This perceived trustworthiness (at the
beginning of period t) is denoted pt. Suppose that
the trustor’s interest in entering such a relationship
is increasing in its expected payoffs. We use At to
denote the trustor’s gains in period t from its rela-
tion with a trustworthy trustee (At > 0); conversely,
Bt denotes the trustor’s losses in period t from its
relation with an untrustworthy trustee (Bt < 0).
Following Coleman (1990) and Nooteboom
(2002), we write the trustor’s expected payoff from
relationship R in period t as
Et [R] = pt At + (1 − pt ) Bt . (1)
A trustor’s willingness to engage in a relationship
relative to not engaging in a relationship increases
in the expected payoffs as given in Equation 1.
Hence, trust increases with Et[R], because trust is
the willingness to be vulnerable to the actions of
another party, i.e., the willingness to engage in a
relationship with the other party.1
This description embodies four key ingredients
of trust common to existing definitions. First,
trust is the willingness to engage in a relation-
ship with the other party (i.e., an intention to
act), not the actual decision to engage in the
relationship (i.e., accepting vulnerability) (Mayer
et al., 1995; Rousseau et al., 1998). Second,
trust as the trustor’s willingness to engage in
a relationship, which increases with Et[R], is
different from the perception of the trustee’s
trustworthiness (pt) (Colquitt et al., 2007; Hardin,
2002; Mayer et al., 1995). Third, trust is formed
under uncertainty because the trustor can only
guess the other’s trustworthiness (as reflected
in 0 < pt < 1). Because At and Bt are uncertain
to occur, there is vulnerability, without which
the role of trustworthiness (and trust) is limited
(Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 1994). Hence, trust is
different from the “shadow of the future” effect
that arises in repeated games (e.g., Vanneste and
Frank, 2013), where a long-time horizon or a low
discount rate may guarantee cooperation even
among untrustworthy partners because it is in their
best interest (Friedman, 1971). Fourth, trust as an
intention to act depends on the context-dependent
payoffs At and Bt. We may trust a partner in one
situation but not in another (Bhattacharya et al.,
1998; Coleman, 1990; Deutsch, 1958).
How trust develops over time
Given this conceptualization of trust as an increas-
ing function of the left-hand side of Equation 1,
1 In other words, trust can be described as a monotonically
increasing function f of Et[R] such that ∂f (Et[R])/∂Et[R] > 0.
Variations in the propensity to trust (see Colquitt, Scott, and
LePine, 2007; Ortmann, Fitzgerald, and Boeing, 2000), can be
captured through a less or more steep (but always increasing in
Et[R]) function f .
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changes in trust must follow when the right-hand
side changes. This can occur through at least
four different mechanisms: initial bias correction,
change in relationship value, identification, and
trust-based selection. In the real world these mech-
anisms may co-occur, but we discuss each mecha-
nism separately to enhance clarity. Consequently,
our propositions have the usual ceteris paribus
interpretation. Table 2 gives an overview of the
mechanisms and their effect on the association
between trust and relationship duration.
Mechanism 1: initial bias correction
Before entering any relationship, a trustor may be
pessimistic, unbiased, or optimistic about the part-
ner’s trustworthiness (in the formal description,
this is denoted by p1). A pessimistic (optimistic)
trustor is one who underestimates (overestimates)
that trustworthiness; an unbiased trustor makes the
correct estimation. The trustor’s initial bias has
an effect not only on the willingness to begin
a relationship but also on the evolution of trust
within a relationship once it is established, as we
explain next.
Engaging in a relationship provides the trustor
with firsthand evidence, influencing the trustor’s
estimate of its partner’s trustworthiness. Thus,
the trustor gradually revises its assessment of the
trustee to approach the true level of trustworthi-
ness. For a pessimistic initial assessment, this may
lead to increasing trust (Anderson and Weitz, 1989;
Lewicki and Bunker, 1995; Shapiro et al., 1992).
Conversely, an initially optimistic trustor is more
likely to revise its beliefs downward, decreasing
trust over time. For unbiased trustors, trust will
remain constant over time on average. Because
trust increases in the perceived trustworthiness
of the trustee, initial bias correction will affect
whether trust increases or decreases over time.
Proposition 1a: With an optimistic (pessimistic,
unbiased) initial belief about the other’s
trustworthiness, on average trust will decline
(increase, not change) over time.
As an illustration, suppose initial beliefs about
trustworthiness are more optimistic when an
acquirer and its target are from the same industry
than when they are from different industries. Such
optimism could be explained by an in-group bias
by which people ascribe better qualities to oth-
ers from the same group (Tajfel, 1982). One such
quality is trustworthiness (Brewer, 1996; Platow,
McClintock, and Liebrand, 1990). If post-merger
integration carries informative signals about firms’
trustworthiness, the optimistic initial bias should
result in trust forming more rapidly (or decreas-
ing less rapidly) after between-industry than after
within-industry acquisitions.2
The research of Pillutla et al. (2003) and Weber
et al. (2005) suggests a moderator of Proposition
1a.3 Trusting acts (by the trustor) may affect
trustworthiness (of the trustee). For example, a
decision by the trustor to engage in a relationship
with the trustee may make the trustee more
trustworthy. Hence, a more optimistic trustor
may endogenously lead to a more trustworthy
trustee. As long as the endogenous increase in
trustworthiness does not lead to a reversal in
the bias (i.e., optimistic becomes pessimistic, or
vice versa), Proposition 1a holds. The effect of
Proposition 1a will be weaker in the presence of
the moderator and stronger in its absence.
Proposition 1b: If the trustor’s trusting acts
affect the trustee’s trustworthiness, then the
effect of initial bias correction on trust is
weakened: an optimistic bias will lead to a
smaller reduction in trust, whereas a pessimistic
bias will lead to a smaller increase in trust .
If the trustor can expand or shrink the scope
of the relationship, then a change in perceived
trustworthiness has an additional effect on trust.
Consider a relationship in which the trustor can
either choose project 1 with a large scope or
project 2 with a small scope. The interesting case
is when both the upside and downside of project
1 are greater (i.e., A1t > A2t and |B1t|> |B2t|).
If a project has a greater upside and smaller
downside, then that project is preferred regardless
of perceived trustworthiness, and project choice
will not change over time. In contrast, the choice
between the projects 1 and 2 above depends on
2 A reviewer pointed out that, if people entering relationships
tend to be positively biased in their expectations regarding
trustworthiness or gains from the exchange, then subsequent
corrections should lead to a decline in trust. We believe it is
an empirical question whether such a bias is widespread.
3 We thank a reviewer for encouraging us to explore this
moderator.
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Table 2. When does trust increase over time?
Mechanism
Element: Et[R] = pt At
+ (1 − pt)Bt Over time, on average, trust
Decreases Increases
1. Initial bias correction p1 Optimistic: trustor
overestimates the level
of trustworthiness
Pessimistic: trustor
underestimates the level of
trustworthiness
2. Change in relationship
value
At, Bt At : decreases upside At : increases upside
Bt : increases downside Bt : decreases downside
3. Identification Trustor: higher At and
lower Bt
Trustor: obtains higher utility
from trusting
Trustee: pt increases Trustee: becomes more
trustworthy
4. Trust-based selection Et[R] > Et[NR] Trustor terminates relationships
if perceived trustworthiness
is low
perceived trustworthiness: project 1 is preferred if
perceived trustworthiness is high, else project 2
(as long as project 2 provides more value than not
being in the relationship).4 A pessimistic trustor
may initially prefer project 2, but after awhile
the trustor may prefer project 1 as the beliefs
about trustworthiness are revised upward. If so,
then trust not only increases because perceived
trustworthiness increases (Proposition 1a), but
also because for the new level of perceived
trustworthiness, the expected value from project
1 is greater than that of 2 (else, the trustor would
not have switched). The trustor’s willingness to
engage in the relationship (i.e., trust) goes up even
more. Likewise, an optimistic trustor may over
time reduce the perception of trustworthiness, and
consequently prefer project 2 over 1, leading to
a lesser decline in trust (relative to the situation
where project 1 could not have been abandoned).5
Proposition 1c: The possibility to adjust the
scope of the relationship positively moderates
4 If the trustor prefers the highest expected value, then
project 1 is chosen for high p, project 2 for intermedi-
ate p, and no relationship for low p. Formally, she will
choose project 1 over 2 if pA1t + (1 − p)B1t > pA2t + (1 − p)B2t
⇔ p > (B2 − B1)/(A1 − A2 + B2 − B1). Project 2 is pre-
ferred over no relationship if pA2t + (1 − p)B2t > 0 ⇔
p > B2/(−A2 + B2). To ensure that project 2 is preferred
for some intermediate p, it must be that the threshold p
for project 1 is greater than the threshold for project 2:
(B2 − B1)/(A1 − A2 + B2 − B1) > B2/(−A2 + B2), which is the
case as long as A1/B1 = A2/B2.
5 We thank a reviewer for suggesting this mechanism.
the effect of an initial bias on trust: an optimistic
bias will lead to a smaller reduction in trust,
whereas a pessimistic bias will lead to a greater
increase in trust.
Mechanism 2: exogenous change in relationship
value
Trust is context specific (Bhattacharya et al., 1998;
Coleman, 1990; Deutsch, 1958); hence, a party
might be trusted in one context but not in
another. This intuition is captured by Equation 1,
where the level of trust is a function of the
relationship’s value (i.e., payoffs At and Bt).
So, if a trustor and trustee interact in different
contexts over time, then trust can change even
when perceived trustworthiness in the relationship
remains constant.
Suppose that, in each period, a trustor and a
trustee engage in a task with given payoffs. Then,
all else (including perceived trustworthiness) being
equal, trust is increasing in At and decreasing in
Bt. Changes in relationship value thus imply the
following statements:
Proposition 2a: If the gains from a partner’s
trustworthy behavior increase (decrease) over
time, then trust will likewise increase (decrease)
over time.
Proposition 2b: If the losses from a partner’s
untrustworthy behavior increase (decrease)
over time, then trust will decrease (increase)
over time.
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It is important to note that these propositions
refer to trust—the trustor’s willingness to engage
in a relationship with the trustee (i.e., an intention
to act)—as distinct from a trusting act—which
occurs when the trustor actually engages with the
trustee (i.e., the actual accepting of vulnerability).
A situation with high vulnerability (i.e., low At
and/or high Bt) will lead to a low willingness
to engage in a relationship (i.e., low trust), see
Propositions 2a and 2b. However, a trusting act in
a situation with high vulnerability must imply high
perceived trustworthiness.
Propositions 2a and 2b describe exogenous
changes in relationship value. Proposition 1c is
about endogenous changes in relationship value.
Their implications differ in the following way. If
we consider the earlier projects 1 and 2 where 1 has
a greater upside and downside (i.e., A1t >A2t and
|B1t|> |B2t|), then exogenously forcing the trustor
to switch projects may lead to lower or higher
trust depending on perceived trustworthiness. In
contrast, if the trustor is free to choose, then she
will only switch projects if that makes her more
willing to engage in the relationship; trust will
necessarily go up.
Relationship-specific investments affect gains
and losses in an exchange relation (Bidwell and
Fernandez-Mateo, 2010; Williamson, 1975, 1985).
For instance, Bt (the trustor’s potential loss in
period t) would increase in response to an increase
in the possibility of being “held up” by an
opportunistic partner. Consider a company that
has invested in a relationship with supplier S1
but could transfer its investment to supplier S2
at some cost, and at higher cost to supplier S3
(but not elsewhere). Now assume that S2 is no
longer an option because of some exogenous event
(e.g., bankruptcy). We can then expect that, since
Bt has increased (because S1 can now inflict
larger damages by acting opportunistically), the
firm’s trust in the relation with S1 may decrease.
Suppose now that a change in regulations or
in consumer demand exogenously increases the
supplier’s potential profits At from the relation (and
its investment) but not the losses from the buyer
acting opportunistically (Zajac and Olsen, 1993);
trust should now increase.
Mechanism 3: identification
Identification can work in both directions: a
trustee may identify with a trustor and/or vice
versa. Shapiro et al. (1992) and Lewicki and
Bunker (1995) argue that interactions lead people
to identify with each other over time as they
internalize each other’s preferences. Hence, as X
and Y interact with each other repeatedly, X begins
to care about good and bad outcomes for Y and
considers them as also being good and bad for
himself (and vice versa). This dynamic leads to
increased trustworthiness (Kramer, 1999; Lewicki
and Bunker, 1995; Poppo et al., 2008; Shapiro
et al., 1992). As X begins to care about Y receiving
good outcomes, X becomes more trustworthy
from Y’s perspective. If perceived trustworthiness
(eventually) adjusts towards actual trustworthiness,
then over time Y finds X more trustworthy and will
have a higher level of trust in him. This process
essentially increases the benevolence and possible
integrity of the trustee (Mayer et al., 1995). The
faster the trustee identifies with the trustor and the
more the trustor recognizes this identification, the
more rapidly trust increases over time.
Interacting repeatedly can also induce a trustor
to identify with the trustee—the trustor cares
also about the trustee’s payoffs. Identification then
increases the trustor’s payoffs as they become an
increasing function of the trustee’s (positive) pay-
offs. In Equation 1, this is equivalent to increasing
trust by increasing At or by decreasing Bt, where
either change is endogenous to the relationship
(unlike our previous mechanism involving exoge-
nous changes in relationship value). Note that iden-
tification can lead to an increase but never decrease
in trust over time.
Proposition 3: If partners identify more with
each other over time, then trust will increase
over time.
One implication of this claim is that trust devel-
ops differently across contexts in which the rate
of identification differs. Consider the difference
between services being outsourced offshore ver-
sus onshore (Srikanth and Puranam, 2011). For
contracts of identical duration between the same
client and vendor, the frequency of interaction
is probably higher with onshore than with off-
shore outsourcing because of the geographical dis-
tances involved. If identification increases with the
number of face-to-face interactions (Lewicki and
Bunker, 1995; Shapiro et al., 1992) and if there
are more interactions in onshore than offshore out-
sourcing, then identification between client and
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vendor personnel will develop more rapidly in
onshore settings. Similarly, trust between the per-
sonnel involved should develop more quickly for
onshore than for offshore outsourcing.
Mechanism 4: trust-based selection
Dealing with unsuccessful relationships plays a
crucial role in the evolution of trust over time.
Given the possibility of exit, a trustor will con-
tinue to interact only with partners that are trusted
(Gambetta, 1988). Hence, such partners are more
likely to continue the relationship (Anderson and
Weitz, 1989; Doney and Cannon, 1997; Gane-
san, 1994). A trustor’s long-lived relationships
will then be primarily with trustworthy partners
because untrustworthy ones are deselected over
time. Therefore, trust should be high in long-lived
relationships.
The shorter relationships in which a trustor is
involved will feature a mix of trustworthy and
untrustworthy partners because, in such relations,
the trustor has not yet gathered enough information
on whether or not the trustee is trustworthy.
Deselection implies that trustors will, on average,
have more trust in long-lived than in short-lived
relationships. Note that this mechanism affects the
average level of trust in a portfolio of relationships
of a single trustor because it results in that portfolio
including mainly trustworthy partners. However,
trust-based deselection does not affect the level of
trust in a given relationship between a trustor and
trustee.
Proposition 4: With deselection of untrustworthy
partners, the average trust in a portfolio of
relationships will increase over time.
One implication of this statement is that the rate
of trust development in a portfolio of relationships
depends on the presence of exit barriers. The easier
it is to cancel contracts and discard untrustworthy
partners, the faster is the increase in partners’
average trustworthiness. So, if contract workers are
more easily laid off than employees, then a firm’s
average trust may increase more rapidly in contract
workers than in regular employees. Similarly, you
may increase trust in friends more rapidly than in
your family members because only the former can
be deselected (“you can choose your friends but
you can’t choose your relatives”).
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Our analysis indicates that numerous possible
moderators of the relationship between trust and
relationship duration exist because multiple (and
sometimes opposing) mechanisms link the two.
Mechanisms 3 and 4 lead to the prediction that
trust increases with relationship length, while
mechanisms 1 and 2 do not generate unambiguous
predictions. Unless we know the mechanisms’
direction and relative strength, we cannot predict
whether trust increases or decreases over time.
This paper makes both theoretical and empirical
contributions. Empirically, we assess evidence
on the link between relationship duration and
trust more comprehensively than prior work has
done. Theoretically, we build on established trust
definitions to clarify known and to suggest new
mechanisms that influence how trust develops over
time. Thus, we can distinguish among several
related constructs: trust, trustworthiness, context,
uncertainty, and propensity to trust.
Two established mechanisms (identification and
trust-based selection) are readily represented in our
formalization. It also advances our understanding
of two novel mechanisms via which trust devel-
ops over time. First, trust between parties may
increase as they learn about each other’s trust-
worthiness (Anderson and Weitz, 1989; Lewicki
and Bunker, 1995; Shapiro et al., 1992); however,
learning leads to more trust only in the case of
pessimistic initial beliefs about such trustworthi-
ness. Second, exogenous changes in relationship
value also affect trust as a situation-specific con-
struct. Situations can differ in the potential gains
(or losses) arising from a relation with a trust-
worthy (or untrustworthy) partner. For instance,
exogenous changes in the value of relationship-
specific investments or in the availability of alter-
native partners may lead to either an increase or
a decrease in trust. If such changes occur system-
atically over time, then relationship duration and
trust may be correlated.
Perhaps the most important implication of
our results for future research is that merely
correlating trust and relationship duration yields
limited insight because a number of mechanisms
could have either negative or positive (or no)
effects. The net effect is indeterminate a priori .
Further, the available evidence is seldom sufficient
to determine which mechanisms are at play. Our
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meta-analytic results are consistent with multiple
combinations of different mechanisms.
This difficulty in extracting the underlying
mechanisms from available data suggests that
examining moderators of the association (between
trust and relationship duration) is more promising
than looking at the main effect. While others
may exist, we identify four classes of constructs
that could be measured: initial beliefs, situational
payoffs, mutual identification, and deselection.
Isolating these would provide researchers the
opportunity to study them in combination. For
example, if trustworthiness is domain specific, then
how does a changing situation affect the value of
the relationship and the level of trustworthiness,
and ultimately how trust develops? Finally, it
would be illuminating to study how trustors
revise their opinion as well as how (if at all)
they generalize experiences with partners to their
initial beliefs about new partners from the same
population.
We acknowledge certain limitations. First, our
meta-analysis relies on nonexperimental data.
Using pairwise correlations between trust and rela-
tionship duration implies that uncontrolled factors
(of which we identify some in our theory) may
influence these correlations. Second, the studies we
analyze use cross-sectional data. Although our the-
oretical mechanisms should be reflected in such
data, inferring their existence or strength is dif-
ficult. Third, we conceptually distinguish differ-
ent mechanisms affecting the development of trust
over time, but the data at hand do not let us distin-
guish them empirically. Despite these limitations, a
meta-analysis can better separate true effects from
noise (i.e., sampling error) than individual studies.
How trust develops in the course of a relation-
ship is key to many studies on the performance
and structure of exchange relationships, includ-
ing alliances, organization design, contracting, and
social embeddedness. We propose ways in which
a more sophisticated understanding of this rela-
tionship can be built. Because mechanisms likely
have an unequal impact across domains, identify-
ing when which mechanisms matter the most may
enrich the theory specific to each.
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